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Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to
explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both
the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election,
introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our
electorate, we analyze what turnout states are rationalizable under various conditions. Our model predicts
comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary
assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between our model and empirical voter behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A problem that has plagued political scientists for decades without satisfactory resolution is the apparent irrationality of
voting. One should only vote if the benefits outweigh the costs, and, if voting is considered to be an instrumental means to an
end of effecting political change, this is rarely the case [9]. In the discussion of this anomaly, the payoff an individual receives
for voting is typically represented by the following expression:
pB − c, where
p = the probability that one’s vote will be pivotal,
B = the benefit differential one derives from one’s preferred candidate gaining office, and
c = all opportunity costs associated with the act of voting
Individuals only choose to vote if this expression is positive, an outcome that is extremely unlikely when considering the
remarkably small values of p inherent in most elections. For an American presidential election, this value is less than one in ten
million [36]. Furthermore, in an empirical study on U.S. Congressional and state elections, it was found that only one out of
every 100,000 votes cast in U.S. elections was cast for a candidate that either tied or won by a single vote [25]. The fact that p
is likely to be so miniscule, then, should deter any individual with even the most negligible voting costs from going to the polls,
driving turnout rates effectively to zero. Paradoxically, a wise individual would realize that, with no other rational individuals
voting, p would effectively become one, and she (along with all other individuals) should vote, again decreasing p, and so on.
The seeming irrationality of one of the most fundamental acts of democracy set many political scientists and economists into
motion in an attempt to explain how rational voters can vote with high turnout rates, even when facing non-negligible costs.
Initially, [30] offered the potential solution that Downs’s model was incomplete, and that there should be another benefit term
that is not scaled by the probability that one’s vote is pivotal. This term represents a consumption benefit one derives from
voting, and could be seen as the satisfaction one receives from fulfilling one’s civic duty via electoral participation. Riker and
Ordeshook explain that adding a variable (they use D in their payoff equation) for the consumption benefit one derives from
voting accounts for the rationality of high voter turnout when it is clear that the probability that an individual’s vote will impact
the outcome of the election is staggeringly small. Many criticized this model for offering little insight into voting motivations,
as the magnitude of one’s D term seems to almost entirely dictate the decision of whether or not to vote. Additionally, it does
not account for behavior like changes in turnout in the same region for different types of elections [15]. Lastly, while the results
from this model compare well with election data within a given year, they do not seem to hold up when analyzing election data
across different years [1].
Another proposed solution to Downs’ paradox is that, rather than utility maximizers, rational individuals are regret minimax-
ers; that is, they choose the strategy that minimizes the chance of ending up with the result that would produce their maximum
regret [13]. While supporting high turnout equilibria, the minimax regret model has been largely discounted in the literature,
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2with critics pointing out that a true regret minimaxer would be so risk-averse that they would never cross the street, even if the
polling location were on the other side [8].
Others have used a game-theoretic to help explain the phenomenon of voting. [20] posits a model of voting behavior that
includes voters and candidates as players in a voting game, but finds zero turnout in equilibrium. One of the more promising
attempts to break the paradox of not voting was undertaken in [27]. Palfrey and Rosenthal find that, in their model, high
turnout behavior can be supported, even in the presence of high costs. Two years later, they build on this model by introducing
uncertainty about voting costs, noting that the equilibria found in their 1983 paper were fragile insofar as they rested on the
assumption that costs were common knowledge to the entire electorate. They find that, once some information about voting
costs is restricted to individuals themselves, the high turnout equilibria vanish [29].
Others have attempted to use information in a different context to explain voting, referring to the information one has about
the candidates and the potential political consequences of their elections to office. In an attempt to explain voting patterns, [23]
claims that the more information a citizen has, the higher the payoff she receives from voting is, as she is more confident in her
vote. Similarly believing in the power of information to explain voter turnout, Feddersen and Pesendorfer create a model that
assumes asymmetric information in a population; however, it is in discord with both Matsusaka’s formulation of the information
effect on turnout and simple logic, as abstention rates are at times positively correlated with the proportion of informed voters in
the population [12].
A different voting model that has gained traction in the political science community as a potential solution to the paradox
of not voting assumes that, rather than being entirely self-interested when deciding whether or not to vote, individuals are rule
utilitarians [17]. Rule utilitarians follow a rule (for voting, in this setting) that, if followed by everybody, leads to the result that
yields the maximum utility. Harsanyi does not indicate how this rule applies to situations in which there are divergent opinions
regarding what the most socially desirable outcome is, which is undoubtedly the case when it comes to partisan politics. [10]
considers this possibility and allows disagreement about what the utility-maximizing outcome is, outlining a model where
turnout is motivated by disagreement within an electorate. This type of model is corroborated by empirical evidence, with
the group rule-utilitarian model explaining nearly half of the variation in voter turnout in Texas liquor referenda [7]. Contrary
to this support, [24] finds that, upon comparing this ‘ethical’ voting model with many others using the concealed parameter
recovery method, the ethical model performs relatively poorly. Furthermore, [11] claims that group-based models such as the
rule-utilitarian and altruistic voting model [22] are problematic as they do not ensure the existence of equilibria, allow for mixed
strategy equilibria, or explain why people join groups in the first place, which Feddersen believes is relevant in the calculus of
voting for group-based models.
Others have attempted to model voters as learners in a survival approach rather than rational utility maximizers. [34] assumes
voters repeat strategies that induced pleasure and avoid strategies that induced punishment. Sieg and Schulz find that, while in
some scenarios their model predicts Downs’ troubling result of zero turnout, it can also lead to individuals ‘learning’ participa-
tion. [28] supports the promising nature of this work, stating that learning over time is a helpful tool for narrowing down the
multiplicity of equilibria that may arise in voting games. Furthermore, evolutionary processes in electoral settings are supported
by empirical studies such as [32], which finds learning processes are present within the electorate of the French Fifth Republic.
While Sieg and Schulz’s model certainly sheds light on turnout behavior, it does not allow for any mixed equilibria, a possibility
that is worth considering when we observe similar people behaving in divergent ways in electoral settings.
Many others have conducted experiments and empirical studies to examine voter behavior and test the validity of some
of the different voter models proposed in the literature. Some have studied the effect of different representation systems on
turnout [33]; [3], while others have focused on the comparative statics of election data to observe how factors such as size
and perceived closeness relate to turnout. Many studies have found a size effect, wherein turnout decreases as electorate size
increases [31]; [16]; [2]; [6]; [21] and many have found a closeness effect, wherein turnout decreases as the closeness of an
election decreases [35]; [21], although closeness can be evaluated in different ways. [19] tries to explain these relationships
qualitatively, claiming that electoral closeness and size reflect heterogeneity in an electorate, which in turn increases voter
turnout. Other studies use these results as evidence that voters are rational actors that follow Downs’ voting utility formulation,
as their votes are more likely to be pivotal in small electorates and close elections. The consensus seems to be that, while this
evidence supports the idea that voting is not solely motivated by a ‘consumption benefit’ that one invariably gets from going to
the polls, it is not solely motivated by pivotal-vote considerations either. For example, Breux et al. finds that rational choice
theory can explain approximately 45% of voter turnout in municipal elections. An empirical study of presidential elections
found that, while the rational voter hypothesis seems unable to explain turnout in its entirety, neither can ‘civic duty’ arguments
[14]. [15] also notes that rational utility maximization is just a part of the explanation for why people vote.
In fact, there is a growing literature against homo economicus, or the idea that human behavior, and in this case voting behavior,
should be viewed strictly through the economic lens of utility maximization that Downs placed on it. This is not to say that voters
are irrational, but rather that they have payoff structures that reflect considerations Downs did not include. One can then analyze
how rational individuals would act in this new voting setting that is more reflective of political considerations. [26] challenges
homo economicus by blending economic and sociological concepts when analyzing voter behavior. Overbye conceptualizes
voting as an investment in the reputation that one is concerned about the public good. [5] points out that political and economic
behavior are inherently different, with political behavior having not only the instrumental benefit that an economic decision has,
3but also an expressive benefit. [4] expands upon this idea by explaining that, while people certainly try to affect outcomes when
they vote, they also benefit from expressing their political views. Brennan explains that humans exhibit expressive behavior all
the time, from going to watch one’s favorite team play football to sending a get well soon card to a relative. Importantly, he
notes that expressive behavior is not necessarily outcome-independent, which would have an effect similar to that of the Riker-
Ordeshook model’s D term. With this idea in mind, we posit a game-theoretic model for voting behavior that blends instrumental
and expressive motivations in an attempt to better understand the dynamics behind voter turnout in partisan elections. We outline
our base model in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze this model and its implications for voter behavior. Section 4 compares the
turnout predictions of our model with trends in real electoral data. Section 5 discusses some possible extensions to our model,
and in Section 6 we conclude.
II. BASE MODEL
Our model assumes a two-candidate election in which each member of the electorate has preferences regarding which candi-
date’s election to office they perceive will lead to a superior outcome. The electorate can then be partitioned into two blocs, one
that supports the first candidate, which we will henceforth call candidate A, and one that supports the second candidate, which
we will refer to as candidate B. We further assume that individuals will not vote for the candidate they do not support, a finding
consistent with [18], which claims that citizens tend to vote sincerely. For simplicity, we assume that more people support candi-
date A than candidate B. We consider an N person election in which pA (> 00.5) is the proportion of the electorate that supports
candidate A and pB (= 1 − pA) is the proportion of the electorate that supports candidate B. We assume a simultaneous-vote and
winner-take-all (majority-rule) election, lest pivotal concerns become irrelevant, as they could in a system of proportional repre-
sentation. Each individual in our model then faces a binary decision: vote for her candidate of choice, or abstain. Furthermore,
there are three distinct electoral outcomes: one’s candidate of choice wins, one’s candidate of choice loses, or one’s candidate
of choice ties. With this in mind, we define the payoff structure for a supporter of candidate j ∈ (A, B) as follows:
−1 Vote and candidate j loses
1 − c(p j − 0.5) Vote and candidate j wins
1/2 Vote and candidate j ties
0 Abstain
(1)
To provide rationale for these payoffs, we urge the reader to participate in a thought experiment. In a similar vein to [4],
our quasi-expressive voting model can be compared to the expressive act of seeing one’s favorite football team play. When
considering whether or not to go to the game, one weighs the potential benefits with the costs of attendance, such as gas, tickets,
and the opportunity cost of foregone leisure. If one’s preferred team is going to lose, one is better off staying at home and not
incurring the costs of attendance. That is, there is no expressive benefit to attending the game if one’s team of choice loses;
nobody wants to walk out of the stadium wearing the colors of the losing team, and one could have done better by staying home.
However, if one’s team is going to win, one will usually want to attend the game. It is not enough to just be a supporter of
the winning team; if one wants to reap the benefits associated with victory, be it the high fives with other fans or storming the
field upon victory, one must have gone to the game. In this case, one is glad to have expressed one’s preferences, even with
the knowledge that one’s cheering likely did not affect the outcome of the game. Nonetheless, there is an expressive benefit for
showing up to contribute to one’s favorite team when this team wins.
Furthermore, we believe that the utility one gets from attending a game in which one’s team is victorious is affected by how
much one was expecting one’s team to win. One can imagine a game in which team A is almost sure to beat team B. The
joy imparted to an A fan when they nearly inevitably win would certainly be different than the joy imparted to a B fan who
risked coming to the game and saw a shocking underdog victory over the mighty team A. Thus, our model includes what we
call an ‘underdog consideration,’ wherein the majority’s winning payoff is decreasing in the magnitude of the majority, and the
minority’s winning payoff is increasing in the magnitude of the majority. In our case, p j is a proxy for individuals’ perceptions
about the likelihood that candidate j will win the election. The c variable is a non-negative coefficient (an assumption we will
relax later) that scales the degree to which a particular electorate factors this underdog consideration into its payoff structure.
If one’s favorite team ties, the game goes into overtime; that is, a sure loss is prevented. In electoral politics, there is a
surprising lack of consistency regarding the resolution of ties, with tiebreakers like coin flips, re-elections, and, in the 2020 Iowa
caucus, even card draws deciding the fates of the candidates. Regardless, a sure loss is almost always prevented when an electoral
tie occurs. It is noteworthy that, in our payoff structure, the payoff for voting when the election results in a tie is always positive,
and in fact can exceed the payoff for voting when one’s candidate of choice wins. In our football analogy, one might imagine
that, however unlikely, one’s presence at a game that ends in a tie may have played a role in preventing one’s favorite team from
losing the game: that if one less voice had been cheering, the team might just have lost the game (from a lack of motivation or
something of the sort). One’s role in propping up this victory is what motivates this payoff. If this seems far-fetched, consider
4the electoral context. In the case of a tie, it is not an exaggeration to think that one’s vote prevented one’s candidate of choice
from losing the election; in fact, one would err in saying otherwise. Not only is the individual we are considering pivotal in
preventing a loss, but also so is every individual who voted for the same candidate, as well as all of the individuals who voted for
the other candidate, resulting in no negative payoffs in the electorate if this is the electoral outcome. While voting is certainly an
expressive action, it would be ignorant to assume that individuals do not consider the instrumental impact of their vote, and that
they would not derive benefit from playing a pivotal role in preventing the electoral defeat of their preferred candidate.
Now, when it is time to decide whether or not to go to the football game, the fans of each team (or, as one can likely infer by
now, the supporters of each party) now face a decision: given the possible outcomes and one’s respective preferences over these
outcomes, is leaving the costless but benefit-less comfort of home worthwhile?
If we weigh the potential payoffs for voting by their respective likelihoods of occurring and sum over the three possible cases,
we can obtain the expected payoff for voting. If V j is the number of individuals that vote for candidate j, then the payoff an A
supporter expects to receive for voting is
P(VA > VB)[1 − c(pA − 0.5))] + P(VA < VB)(−1) + P(VA = VB)(1/2) (2)
And the payoff a B supporter expects to receive for voting is
P(VA > VB)(−1) + P(VA < VB)[1 − c(pB − 0.5)] + P(VA = VB)(1/2) (3)
Comparing this expected payoff to the sure zero payoff for abstaining, individuals will choose to vote when the expected
payoff for voting is greater than zero and abstain when it is less than zero.
As all citizens face the binary choice of vote vs. abstain, we can model the number of individuals who turn out to vote for
each party as a binomial random variable. Thus, while we assume symmetry within parties, there is an asymmetric aspect to
our game, insofar as voters from different parties can decide to vote with different probabilities. If supporters of candidate j will
vote with probability q j, then
VA ∼ binom(N pA, qA), and
VB ∼ binom(N pB, qB)
As the probability that candidate A wins the election is P(VA > VB), this can be expanded to
N pB∑
k=0
(
N pB
k
)
(qB)k(1 − qB)N pB−k
N pA∑
j=k+1
(
N pA
j
)
(qA) j(1 − qA)N pA− j
Similarly, the probability that candidate B wins is
N pB−1∑
k=0
(
N pA
k
)
(qA)k(1 − qA)N pA−k
N pB∑
j=k+1
(
N pB
j
)
(qB) j(1 − qB)N pB− j
And the probability of a tie is
N pB∑
k=0
(
N pA
k
)
(qA)k(1 − qA)N pA−k
(
N pB
k
)
(qB)k(1 − qB)N pB−k
In order to analyze equilibrium behavior in our model, we plot the points at which A and B supporters are indifferent between
voting and abstaining (that is, when their expected payoffs for voting are exactly equal to zero) over qA and qB to see what
turnout states are rationalizable.
We find that, upon varying our three main parameters (N, pA, and c), these indifference functions can be configured in different
ways that have different implications for voter behavior. We go on to analyze the effects of changing these variables on voter
behavior in the next section.
5III. ANALYSIS
In each plot we show the curve along which A supporters are indifferent between voting and abstaining (red) and the curve
along which B supporters are indifferent between voting and abstaining (blue). The x-axis of each graph is qA and the y-axis is
qB, with both of these variables taking on values in the range [0,1]. Figure 1 shows the effect of varying N and pA in our model
when we set c equal to zero.
FIG. 1: The effect of varying N and pA on the indifference functions of A (red) and B (blue) supporters while c = 0. These functions never
intersect, but approach collinearity as N → ∞.
As we let N grow, A and B’s indifference curves converge to a single line with slope pA/pB. Let us consider why this is
the case. As N gets large, the probability of a tie goes to zero, all else equal. Furthermore, with c (and thus the impact of the
underdog effect) equal to zero, this game simplifies to a game akin to the following: Abstain and get a payoff of zero, vote and
get a payoff of 1 if your candidate of choice wins and -1 if your candidate of choice loses. So, supporters of a given party are
indifferent between voting and abstaining (their expected payoff for voting is equal to zero) when their likelihoods of winning
and losing are approximately equal, or when the expected number of A and B voters are close to the same. As the number of A
and B voters are binomial variables, the expected number of A voters is N pAqA, and the expected number of B voters is N pBqB.
We find that these are equal when qA = pB and qB = pA, making the expected number of voters for both parties equal to N pA pB.
With qA and qB set to these levels, the slope (∆qB/∆qA) approaches pA/pB. With the probability of a tie approaching zero as we
let N get large, the indifference curves of A and B supporters approach the same line with this slope.
Now we want to analyze what turnout states are rationalizable for a given set of parameters. In order to do so, we search not
just for Nash equilibria, but for evolutionarily stable strategies (which we will sometimes refer to as ES S ’s). Similar to Sieg
and Schulz (1995), we consider the learning individual in a voting context, wherein actions that induced pleasure are repeated,
and actions that induced punishment are avoided. To show how we determine evolutionarily stable strategies, we consider the
simple case when N = 10, pA = .6, and c = 0 (bottom left panel of Figure 1).
We first want to consider which regions of the graph correspond to positive or negative expected voting payoffs for both A
and B supporters. Focusing on A supporters (red curve), we know that their expected payoff for voting is exactly zero along
this curve. If qA is unilaterally increased from a point on this curve, then candidate A is more likely to win the election and so
6A supporters are more likely to get the winning (positive when c = 0) payoff for voting. Thus, to the right of the red curve, A
supporters have a positive expected payoff for voting (seen by the red plus in Figure 2). Analogously, when we decrease qA from
a point on the red curve, we find that candidate A is more likely to lose the election, and so A supporters are more likely to get
the negative payoff for voting when candidate A loses. To the left of the red curve then, A supporters have a negative expected
payoff for voting (seen by the red minus in Figure 2).
Similarly, we find that when B supporters increase qB from a point on the blue curve, it will increase candidate B’s likelihood
of winning, and B supporters will have a positive expected payoff for voting. Below the blue curve, then, B supporters will have
a negative expected payoff for voting. These signs can also be seen in Figure 2.
FIG. 2: Example graph with expected voting payoff signs. To the right of the red curve, the expected voting payoff for an A supporter is
positive, and to the left of this curve it is negative. Above the blue curve, the expected voting payoff for a B supporter is positive, and below
this curve it is negative. Parameters are set to N = 10, pA = .6, and c = 0.
In regions where the expected payoff for voting is positive, groups will want to increase the frequency with which they vote,
and in negative regions, they will want to increase the frequency with which they abstain.
As noted earlier, voters are not rational utility maximizers; that is, they do not calculate which decisions yield the best
outcomes. Rather, they start with a random choice, and then repeat actions that induced pleasure, and avoid actions that induced
penalty. These random initial choices for qA and qB can lie in 3 different regions that have different implications for voter
behavior.
If A and B supporters choose initial qA and qB values such that the initial state is above A supporters’ indifference curves, then
in this region A supporters get a negative expected payoff for voting, and B supporters get a positive expected payoff for voting
(Figure 3a). Consequently, A supporters will decrease the likelihood with which they vote (leftward-pointing arrows in Figure
3a) and B supporters will increase the likelihood with which they vote (upward-pointing arrows in Figure 3a). This process will
iterate, with qA decreasing and qB increasing until turnout ”runs away” to the stable state of no A turnout and full B turnout.
If, instead, the initial state is below B supporters’ indifference curve, then voting has a positive expected payoff for A supporters
and a negative expected payoff for B supporters (Figure 3b). Thus, qA will increase and qB will decrease until we reach the other
stable state of full A turnout and no B turnout.
Finally, if the initial state is between these curves, then all individuals have a positive expected payoff for voting (Figure
3c). Both A supporters and B supporters will increase their voting probabilities until turnout breaks into one of the two original
regions, and runs away to the respective stable state of either full A turnout and no B turnout or no A turnout and full B turnout.
So whenever c = 0 and the indifference curves are configured in this way, the two stable states are full A turnout and no B
turnout, or no A turnout and full B turnout.
We now go on to analyze how these indifference curves and their associated stable states change as we alter c. Figure 4 shows
the effect of increasing c from 0 but below 1/(pA − 0.5), the value for which the voting payoff for an A supporter when candidate
A wins would become negative. We hold N and pA constant at 10 and .6 respectively throughout this analysis in order to make
our evolutionarily stable strategies more visually compelling, but the types of evolutionarily stable strategies are the same if we
vary either N or pA within the ranges of c that we enumerate later. The effect of changing these parameters while holding c
7FIG. 3: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies when N = 10, pA = .6, and c = 0. 3a (left panel): If A supporters and B supporters choose voting
probabilities such that the initial state (represented by a black point) is in the top left region of the graph, then turnout will run away to the
evolutionarily stable strategy (denoted by the green point) of qA = 0, qB = 1. 3b (middle panel): If the initial state is in the bottom right region
of the graph, the evolutionarily stable strategy will be qA = 1, qB = 0. 3c (right panel): If the initial state is between these curves, both qA and
qB will increase until the state breaks into one of the first two regions. This will lead to one of the two evolutionarily stable strategies from
before.
constant is analyzed in Section 3.2.
FIG. 4: The effect of increasing c from zero (left-most panel) but below 1/(pA − 0.5) (increasing from left to right). At first there is one mixed
Nash when A’s indifference curve is tangent to B’s. As we increase c further, the curves intersect twice, and as we increase c beyond this point,
there is just one low-turnout intersection.
We now go on to analyze what evolutionarily stable strategies are rationalizable in the cases shown in Figure 4, when there
exist intersections (and associated mixed-strategy Nash equilibria) between A and B’s indifference curves. Figure 5 shows the
results of this analysis.
We find that, although these curves have mixed-strategy equilibria, they are unstable: any infinitesimal deviation by either A
or B supporters from these Nash probabilities would give rise to further deviation. In each of these cases, we find that turnout
once again runs away to the same two stable states as before: either full A turnout and no B turnout, or no A turnout and full B
turnout.
We now go on to analyze the effect that increasing c beyond 1/(pA − 0.5) will have on the configurations and respective
turnouts of A and B’s indifference curves. It is notable that once c exceeds 1/(pA − 0.5), the payoff for an A supporter voting
when candidate A wins becomes negative. In this situation, the only way that an A supporter can get a positive payoff for voting
is if the candidates tie, and this individual’s vote is pivotal in preventing a loss for candidate A. We first focus on cases when
1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5), as once c exceeds 2/(pA − 0.5), the payoff for an A supporter voting when candidate A wins
becomes lower than -1, which is the payoff for an A supporter voting when candidate A loses. The effect of increasing c between
1/(pA − 0.5) and 2/(pA − 0.5) is shown in Figure 6.
8FIG. 5: Regardless of the number of intersections between A and B’s indifference curves, when 0 ≤ c ≤ 1/(pA − 0.5), the only evolutionarily
stable strategies (represented by green points) that survive are qA = 1 (full A turnout) and qB = 0 (no B turnout) or qA = 0 (no A turnout) and
qB = 1 (full B turnout).
FIG. 6: The effect of increasing c on the configuration A and B’s indifference curves when 1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5). c is increasing in
panels from left to right.
We go on to analyze evolutionarily stable strategies for these examples in Figure 7. It is noteworthy that A’s expected voting
payoff is not always increasing in qA when c is in this range. If qA is sufficiently high (and qB is sufficiently low), then A
supporters will be likely to win and accordingly get the negative payoff associated with voting and winning. This will compel A
supporters to abstain more and increase the likelihood of a tied election.
In each of these examples, it is clear that the stable state of no A turnout and full B turnout still exists, but now the stable state
of full A turnout and no B turnout disappears. Instead, each of these cases has a stable state with some A turnout in expectation
and no B turnout. This expected A turnout is decreasing in c (left to right in Figure 7).
We find that A supporters’ ability to vote with these probabilities strictly between zero and one in equilibrium is supported by
the fact that A supporters always have a curve that is stable when c is in this range; that is, if A supporters increase qA beyond
(to the right of) this stable curve, they will get a negative expected payoff from voting and will abstain more by decreasing qA,
moving back towards the curve. If qA is decreased beyond (to the left of) this stable curve, A supporters will get a positive
expected payoff from voting, and will vote more by increasing qA back towards this curve.
In Figure 8 we analyze what happens when c exceeds 2/(pA−0.5). Remember that when c takes on such values, A supporters’
voting payoff when candidate A wins is now less than A supporters’ voting payoff when candidate A loses (-1). We find that
whenever c exceeds this value, A and B’s indifference curves no longer intersect, and the only stable state that remains has no A
9FIG. 7: Evolutionarily stable strategies as we increase c when 1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5). Stable states either have no A turnout and full
B turnout or some A turnout in expectation and no B turnout. Expected A turnout is decreasing in c for the latter stable state.
turnout and full B turnout.
FIG. 8: Evolutionarily stable strategy when c > 2/(pA − 0.5). The only stable state has no A turnout and full B turnout.
To summarize, when 0 ≤ c ≤ 1/(pA − 0.5), there are two stable states: no A turnout and full B turnout, or full A turnout and
no B turnout. When 1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5), there are also two stable states: no A turnout and full B turnout, or some A
turnout (in expectation) and no B turnout. Lastly, when c > 2/(pA − 0.5), the only stable state that remains has no A turnout and
full B turnout. We now go on to consider what negative levels of c might mean qualitatively, and what implications relaxing this
assumption might have for voter behavior.
A. Turnout when c ≤ 0
It is interesting to consider whether having a negative value for c makes sense in respect to human behavior. This would mean
that those who perceive themselves likely to win (in our case, those in the majority) get an additional benefit for voting when
their candidate wins, and those who perceive themselves unlikely to win (in our case, those in the minority) get a penalty on
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their voting payoff when their candidate wins.
Rather than having an underdog effect, wherein people in the minority enjoy their victory more than those in the majority, we
now have a will-of-the-people effect. In this type of world, voters in the majority get a benefit when their candidate wins for
supporting the election of a candidate that more people prefer. Voters in the minority get a penalty when their candidate wins as
they may feel some guilt for electing a candidate that is not as well-supported (leaving this voter feeling somewhat selfish).
With this framework in mind, we go on to analyze what stable states arise from different negative values of c, finding relatively
symmetric results to the positive values of c. Figure 9 shows the results of decreasing c from zero but not beyond 1/(0.5 − pA),
the point at which B supporters’ voting payoff when candidate B wins becomes negative. As we decrease c (left to right in Figure
9), we find that, although we get a varying number of Nash equilibria, we end up with the two stable states of full A turnout and
no B turnout or no A turnout and full B turnout that we found when 0 ≤ c < 1/(pA − 0.5).
FIG. 9: The effect of decreasing c (left to right) from zero but not beyond 1/(0.5 − pA). Regardless of the number of Nash equilibria, there are
only two stable states: full A turnout and no B turnout or no A turnout and full B turnout.
Similar to the positive c case, we find that our evolutionarily stable strategies change once c exceeds 1/(0.5 − pA). Beyond
this point, the voting payoff for a B supporter when candidate B wins becomes negative, meaning that B supporters can only get
a positive payoff from voting if the result of the election is a tie.
This leads to a symmetric finding to the positive c cases: when 2/(0.5 − pA) ≤ c < 1/(0.5 − pA), B supporters have an
indifference curve that is stable. If B supporters deviate from this curve by increasing qB, they will receive a negative payoff
for voting, and will abstain more, decreasing qB towards this curve. If they deviate from this curve by decreasing qB, they will
receive a positive payoff from voting, will vote more, and increase qB back towards this curve.
This allows for equilibria in which supporters from one bloc vote with a probability strictly between zero and one. Once
again, we find that this voting probability is decreasing in the magnitude of c (in the negative direction, in this case). The results
of this analysis can be seen in Figure 10.
When we decrease c beyond 2/(0.5− pA), B supporters’ payoff for voting when candidate B wins becomes less than the payoff
for voting when candidate B loses (-1). In this case, as with its positive analog, A and B’s indifference curves no longer intersect,
and the stable state with partial turnout in expectation disappears (Figure 11).
At this point we have covered all of the different ranges for c and analyzed what evolutionarily stable stategies exist in each
case. A summary of this analysis can be found in Table 1.
TABLE I: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Summary
c Range ES S 1 ES S 2
c > 2/(pA − 0.5) qA = 0, qB = 1
1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5) qA = 0, qB = 1 0 < qA < 1, qB = 0
1/(0.5 − pA) ≤ c ≤ 1/(pA − 0.5) qA = 0, qB = 1 qA = 1, qB = 0
2/(0.5 − pA) ≤ c < 1/(0.5 − pA) qA = 1, qB = 0 qA = 0, 0 < qB < 1
c < 2/(0.5 − pA) qA = 1, qB = 0
B. Comparative Statics
Another thing worth considering is the effect that changing either the size of the population (N) or the partisan spread (pA vs.
pB) would have on voter behavior. Remember that we have thus far focused on the simplistic case of a 6 vs. 4 person election for
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FIG. 10: The effect of decreasing c (left to right) when 2/(0.5 − pA) ≤ c < 1/(0.5 − pA). In each of these cases, there are two stable states:
full A turnout and no B turnout, or no A turnout and some B turnout in expectation. Expected B turnout for the latter case is decreasing in the
magnitude of c.
FIG. 11: An example graph for when c < 2/(0.5 − pA). When c is less than this value, the indifference curves no longer intersect, and the only
stable state has full A turnout and no B turnout.
ease of analysis. While we have analyzed the effect of varying c on turnout for this particular case, we want to see how varying
these other parameters might affect voter behavior.
Table 1 shows that many of our stable states are of the all or nothing variety, with either full turnout or no turnout from the
supporters of each party. We find that these stable states remain regardless of changes to N and pA; whenever c is within the
intervals outlined in Table 1, the all or nothing stable states are not altered by changes in either the number of individuals in the
electorate or the partisan spread of these individuals.
With this in mind, we turn to the cases when one of the parties votes with a probability strictly between zero and one. We
focus on the case when 1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5) and there exists an evolutionarily stable strategy in which 0 < qA < 1,
but we will discuss the comparative statics for the negative analog of this case as well. Figure 12 provides a visual representation
of how this ES S changes as we vary N and pA.
We find that both N and pA effect expected turnout for these equilibria. The more striking influence is this size effect predicted
by our model, wherein expected turnout is decreasing (quite rapidly) in N.
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FIG. 12: The effect of varying N and pA while holding c constant at 10, 001/(10, 000(pA − 0.5)). The evolutionarily stable strategy when A
supporters vote with a probability strictly between zero and one has expected turnout that is decreasing in N as well as pA, ceteris paribus.
This makes sense when we consider the range of c that we are considering. When 1/(pA − 0.5) < c ≤ 2/(pA − 0.5), the only
way A supporters can get a positive payoff for voting is if the result of the election is a tie. In order to drive turnout away from
zero in expectation for A supporters, then, a tie must be sufficiently likely to occur; as we increase N while holding c and pA
constant, the probability of the election resulting in a tie approaches zero, and thus A supporters become unable to vote at high
rates. Focusing on the bottom row of Figure 12, one can imagine how the likelihood of a tie may change from a 6 vs. 4 person
election to a 60 vs. 40 person election to a 600 vs. 400 person election.
Furthermore, we find this size effect to hold true when looking at the negative analog of this case. When 2/(0.5 − pA) ≤ c <
1/(0.5 − pA) and we focus on the evolutionarily stable strategy in which 0 < qB < 1, expected turnout is also decreasing in N.
Back to the positive case, when viewing the impact that varying pA has on expected turnout, it is less dramatic than the impact
of varying N. It is nonetheless the case that expected turnout is decreasing in pA. Let us consider why this is so.
If we hold N and c constant while increasing pA, we are increasing the partisan spread, and making candidate A more likely to
win, all else equal. As A supporters prefer a tie to candidate A winning (as their vote is pivotal), at high pA’s, A supporters will
have a decrease in the qA-cutpoint at which their expected payoff for voting switches from positive to negative. This cutpoint
(when qB is equal to zero) is exactly the evolutionarily stable strategy we are discussing. Therefore, we find expected turnout to
be decreasing in pA for this type of equilibrium.
Once again, we consider whether this comparative static holds for the negative analog of this case. In the negative c scenario,
it is B supporters who will only get a positive payoff from voting if there is a tie. If we consider the qB-cutpoint at which B
supporters’ expected payoff switches from positive (tie is sufficiently likely) to negative (candidate B winning is sufficiently
likely), we should find this point increasing in pA. When B supporters comprise only a very small proportion of the electorate
(large pA), then even at high qB levels, it is less likely that candidate B will win in comparison to when pA is smaller. Thus, we
find the opposite pA effect in the negative case: expected turnout is increasing in pA.
While we do not find a consistent effect of partisan split on expected voter turnout, we do find that, whenever N affects our
equilibrium state, expected voter turnout monotonically decreases in N. We go on to see if this is consistent with real voter
behavior.
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IV. DATA
In general, this size effect, in which turnout and electorate size are negatively correlated, has been found to be consistent with
voter behavior in a myriad of contexts. While many cite this as evidence that Downs’ formulation of the instrumental voter is
correct, others have interpreted the somewhat weak but consistent correlation between electorate size and turnout as evidence
that the instrumentality of one’s vote is only part of the motivation for voting, an interpretation in agreement with out model.
For example, [21] summarizes the results of an experiment conducted in order to examine how voter turnout is affected by
different variables, electorate size among them. Using *electorate sizes no larger than 51, they find strong evidence that size and
turnout are negatively correlated. Levine and Palfrey still find, though, that the size effect cannot entirely explain voting if we
consider the solely instrumental voter; rather, they propose that a blend of rationality models may be necessary to fully explain
voter behavior.
FIG. 13: We find that turnout is decreasing in N, similar to the comparative statics predicted by our model. We use the number of registered
voters as reported by the NYS Board of Elections and the vote count as reported by OpenDataSoft. Turnout is calculated as the number of
votes in the county divided by the number of registered voters in the county. Even when the probability of a tie is quite small, this size effect
seems to persist in voter behavior.
Observational studies support this size effect as well. [6] finds that electorate size is the most important factor in motivating
turnout in the municipal elections they study, but that this impact is more prevalent in relatively small electorates.
Still, even in elections with large electorates (gubernatorial elections in this case), the negative correlation between electorate
size and turnout persists, although it is relatively weak [2]. This is an interesting finding, as our model predicts that this size effect
becomes relatively negligible (as expected turnout approaches zero quickly) as N gets large. As the probability of a tie becomes
staggeringly small in large electorates, we would expect turnout to decrease almost imperceptibly in N for large electorates.
We analyze a dataset with smaller N’s than gubernatorial races- the New York State turnout for the 2016 presidential election
by county (Figure 13). Plotting a least squares regression line over these points, we find that the relationship between voter
turnout and electorate size has the same sign that our model predicts. This relationship is somewhat weak, again suggesting that
individuals do not only consider whether or not their vote will be pivotal when they make the decision of whether or not to vote.
Still, it is notable that this relationship between electorate size and turnout persists even when we are dealing with electorates
that our model predicts would have expected turnout rates extremely close to zero. In an attempt to reconcile this as well as
another common turnout trend with our model, we go on to propose some possible extensions to our base model.
V. EXTENSIONS
Although our model was successful in the direction of its comparative static predictions, it is certainly not without its short-
comings. Our model still underestimates turnout for large electorates, and does not predict any stable states with expected turnout
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from both parties. While we believe that the formulation of voter motives posited by our base model is powerful, allowing for
more variation in our parameters might lead to turnout predictions that are more descriptively accurate.
First, we observe the effect of relaxing the assumption that the partisan split of the electorate is common knowledge, as this
is more often than not the case in the real world. A variety of factors can lead to misperceptions regarding the partisan split of
an electorate. Some people are misguided about this from a lack of information, some from conflicting information, and some
from the spread of false information, an issue ever so present in the most recent election cycles.
If we let p˜A equal the perceived proportion of the population that supports candidate A, with p˜B defined analogously, we
can analyze how these perceptions can impact voter turnout. Consistent with our finding from earlier, in the ES S in which
0 < qA < 1, we find that turnout is decreasing in pA. Thus, allowing c to be a consistent function of p˜A, we find that turnout is
higher in expectation whenever p˜A < pA. We also found that, for the ES S in which 0 < qB < 1, turnout is increasing in pA, and
so is decreasing in pB. In this case, expected turnout is higher whenever p˜B < pB.
This finding is both descriptive and prescriptive. As we’ve noted, people often vote at higher rates than our model predicts;
however, we find that allowing misperceptions about the partisan split of a population might provide an explanation for behavior
that is seemingly irrational. If individuals in the majority feel that the partisan split is closer than in reality it is, this will compel
them to turn out at higher rates than they would if they knew the true distribution of preferences in the electorate. If individuals
in the minority think that a win is not likely, this will motivate more of these individuals to vote as they know every vote for their
candidate is more vital to preventing a loss.
As a disclaimer, we do not advocate the spread of false information by politicians or anyone for that matter. However, we do
find that bending the perceptions of a support base may have tangible impacts on voter turnout. If a candidate has a majority
of the support in an election (particularly a large majority), then she runs the risk of her supporters free-riding and abstaining
while a fraction of supporters vote and prop up the possibility of a tied election. Thus, we find that it may be beneficial for this
candidate to downplay the majority support she holds when talking to her electorate. By convincing supporters that the race is
closer than it actually is, she can avoid this free-rider problem and be more likely to secure her (arguably well-deserved) victory.
On the other side of this, there lies a strategy that a candidate with minority support might find beneficial for spurring turnout
from his support base. When a candidate has minority support, it will behoove him to downplay the size of this support. This
may seem counterintuitive, as one would think that emphasizing how close the race is would motivate turnout. However, our
model finds that whenever a candidate overestimates the magnitude of one’s support to his base (implementing a p˜B that is
larger than pB), he runs the risk of his supporters abstaining more. A candidate in this scenario would find it in his best interest
to downplay the size of his support, compelling supporters to view their vote as more integral to preventing the loss of their
candidate of choice.
While we offer the misperception of pA and pB as a possible solution to the over-voting we see in electoral behavior, we have
yet to account for the fact that, in electoral politics, turnout rates are almost always strictly between zero and one for supporters
of both candidates. To account for this, we relax the assumption that the electorate for a given election has a universal c. If
we allow for a (potentially) different c j for supporters of the different candidates, it is possible to obtain types of evolutionarily
stable strategies that were not possible in the base model.
For example, consider a case when cA is positive and cB is negative. Qualitatively, this means that A voters receive a penalty
for being in the majority when candidate A wins (as this outcome seems inevitable anyways), and B voters receive a penalty for
being in the minority when candidate B wins (as they help elect a candidate that is not well-supported by the electorate). Both
blocs have voting payoffs when their candidate of choice wins that are decreasing in pA.
When we set cA and cB to levels such that the payoff for voting when one’s candidate of choice wins is less than the payoff
for abstaining but greater than the payoff for voting when one’s candidate of choice loses (between 0 and -1), we can find
evolutionarily stable strategies that could not be obtained using our base model alone. Figure 14 shows one such case.
Based on these new parameters, our model predicts three distinct evolutionarily stable strategies: one in which 0 < qA < 1 and
qB = 0, one in which qA = 0 and 0 < qB < 1, and one in which 0 < qA < 1 and 0 < qB < 1. This third ES S is notable because
it reconciles our model with real electoral behavior. In nearly all elections, supporters of each party vote with turnout rates
strictly between zero and one; while our base model is inconsistent with this finding, introducing c diversity between supporters
of different candidates into our payoff structure brings our model in accordance with such behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
While many models have attempted to overcome Downs’ original formulation of the voter problem, our model blends instru-
mental and expressive voting theories, allows for learning in the electorate, and introduces partisan asymmetry in a way that
other models do not. We introduce a new variable, c, to account for the extent to which a given population does or does not
consider the underdog effect when making the decision to vote for one’s candidate of choice or abstain.
We find that changes in this variable compel different types of evolutionarily stable strategies. Depending on the range of c,
our model predicts either one party turning out to vote in full and the other party abstaining in full, or one party partially turning
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FIG. 14: Evolutionarily stable strategies when we allow c diversity in our model. In this simple case (N = 10, pA = .6, cA = 12, cB = −12),
we find three ES S ’s. Most notably there exists an ES S with positive expected turnout from both parties.
out to vote in expectation and the other party abstaining in full. In the latter case, expected turnout is decreasing in electorate
size as well as the magnitude of the party that is expected to vote.
This size effect is well-documented in turnout literature, with turnout decreasing in electorate size even when the probability
that one’s vote is pivotal is extremely small. An analysis of turnout in New York State counties from the 2016 presidential
election agrees with this finding.
While our model predicts turnout that is smaller than we often see in large electorates, relaxing some of our preliminary
assumptions may bring our model more in accordance with true voter behavior. Specifically, we find that when individuals have
misperceptions about the partisan split of an electorate (and, by proxy, the likelihood of affecting the outcome), turnout can be
higher than our base model predicts. Furthermore, we find that, while our base model does not predict positive turnout from
both support blocs in equilibrium (a phenomenon common in electoral politics), introducing c diversity into our model allows
this to exist. We find the incorporation of both partisan misperception and c diversity into our model to be especially promising
in explaining and predicting voter turnout moving forward.
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